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When Your Refrigerator Orders Groceries Online and 
Your Car Dials 911 After an Accident: Do We Really 
Need New Law for the World of Smart Goods? 
Jean Braucher* 
INTRODUCTION 
With digital functionality, goods are already doing amazing things 
and soon will do even more. Manufactured goods increasingly will 
operate with the aid of computer programs and be connected to the 
Internet. The changes in store for us are captured in this headline 
from the online magazine, Wired, Your Car: The Next Net 
Appliance.1 The story discussed beta testing of an operating system 
for embedded software that can be mounted on small and inexpensive 
hardware.2 An explosion in “smart” goods is upon us. 
In this Article, I argue that the law of goods does not need change 
in many of its elements despite current technological change. 
Furthermore, I argue that it makes sense to treat copies of 
freestanding software as goods even if they are in electronic files. 
One body of law should govern transactions in hardware and 
software, including refrigerators, cars, personal computers and their 
operating systems, manufacturing and medical equipment, as well as 
freestanding software itself. These products are all properly classified 
as goods. For these products, Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial 
 
 * Roger Henderson Professor of Law, University of Arizona. This Article was prepared 
for the 2001 Heart of America Intellectual Property Law Conference: “Intellectual Property, 
Digital Technology, and Electronic Commerce,” co-sponsored by Washington University 
School of Law on April 6-7, 2001. 
 1. Leander Kahney, Your Car: The Next Net Appliance, WIRED, Mar. 5, 2001, at 
http://www.wired.com/news/technology/ 0,1282,42104,00.html. 
 2. Id.; See also Margaet Kane, Accenture, Microsoft Carpool on Auto Gadgets, CNET 
News.com, Jan. 10, 2002, at http://news.cnet.com/news/0-1006-200-8428652.html?tag=prntfr) 
(concerning combining cars and computers). 
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Code (U.C.C.) successfully addresses issues of contract formation, 
warranties, performance standards, and damages.3  
The more difficult question is the proper legal framework for 
transfer and use restrictions in contracts for digital products. The 
U.C.C. does not deal adequately with these issues. Sophisticated and 
disinterested law reform is necessary to determine to what extent 
transfer and use restrictions are legitimate commercial tools and to 
what extent these restrictions threaten competition, innovation, and 
free flow of information. The need for nuanced treatment of these 
issues is not a reason for creating a separate body of law for software, 
however, because licensing may become a standard transaction type 
for goods other than software. 
The sponsors of the U.C.C., the American Law Institute (A.L.I.) 
and the National Conference of Commissioners of Uniform State 
Laws (NCCUSL), have been unable to agree on a new legal 
framework for either “smart” goods or freestanding software. In 
2001, they failed to agree on changes in the scope of Article 24 as it 
relates to transactions in these products.5 As a result, efforts to revise 
or amend Article 2 have broken down.6 This was the most recent 
chapter in the disagreement between the two organizations 
concerning the law of software transactions. When the A.L.I. 
concluded that a proposed U.C.C. Article 2B on licenses was not 
 
 3. U.C.C. §§ 2-101 to 2-725 (1992). 
 4. Although the applicable scope provision of existing Article 2, Section 2-102, states 
that it applies to “transactions” in goods, the short title of the Article is “Sales.” U.C.C. § 2-101 
(2000). In addition, most of the Article’s sections are written in terms of buyers and sellers. A 
“sale” is defined as “the passing of title from the seller to the buyer for a price.” U.C.C. § 2-
106(1). Goods are defined as movable things. See U.C.C. § 2-105(1). Comment 1 to Section 1-
102 suggests that it is appropriate to apply the U.C.C. by analogy to subject matter not 
expressly included within the scope of the Act. U.C.C. § 1-102 cmt. 1. 
 5. Final Attempt to Achieve U.C.C. Article 2 Amendments Underway, 24 A.L.I. REP. 
(2001) (describing different approaches of the two organizations in 2001, with the A.L.I. 
membership voting in May 2001 for a version that left scope as is, so that boundary issues 
would continue to be decided by the courts, while NCCUSL’s membership voted in August for 
a scope provision addressing the coverage of software transactions, excluding freestanding 
software but including some embedded software). 
 6. Id. (as of the fall of 2001, there were still efforts underway to draft an acceptable 
scope provision; also stating that if these efforts were successful, the Article 2 amendments 
would require approval in 2002 by the A.L.I. Annual Meeting). However, the A.L.I. did not 
schedule any further work on Article 2 at its May, 2002, meeting, indicating a failure of the 
effort. 
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satisfactory, NCCUSL nonetheless decided to promulgate it as a 
freestanding uniform law, the Uniform Computer Information 
Transactions Act (UCITA).7 UCITA has been enacted in only two 
states.8 Vigorous opposition from a coalition of software user 
interests, including insurance companies, retailers, manufacturers, 
libraries, attorneys general in their capacities as consumer protection 
officials, and consumer advocates, succeeded in stopping the 
legislation everywhere in 2001 and early 2002.9 Three states, more 
than adopted UCITA, have enacted “bombshelter” provisions in an 
attempt to prevent choice of law clauses from making UCITA 
applicable to their residents.10 Furthermore, a special American Bar 
Association (A.B.A.) task force issued a critical report on UCITA in 
January, 2002,11 further diminishing its prospects. As the lone 
dissenter among the nine-member A.B.A. group said, “I know of no 
way that the report can be read other than to require a rewrite of 
UCITA to simplify it and to change many of the policy decisions 
embedded in it . . . .”12 
It seems likely that we are in for a continuing period of case law 
development of the law of software licensing, with Article 2 serving 
as the primary authority, either directly or by analogy. Given the 
flaws in the scope framework approved by NCCUSL in 2001,13 this 
 
 7. Article 2B Is Withdrawn from U.C.C. and Will Be Promulgated by NCCUSL as 
Separate Act, 21 A.L.I. REPORTER (1999), at http://www.ali-aba.org/ali/r2103 (in official 
publication of the A.L.I. reporting that Article 2B would not be promulgated as part of the 
U.C.C. and that A.L.I.’s governing Council “continued to have significant reservations about 
both some of its key substantive provisions and its overall clarity and coherence”). 
 8. The enactments were in Virginia and Maryland. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 51.1-54.1 (2000); 
MD. CODE ANN. [COM. LAW. I] §§ 22-101 to 22-81b (2000). 
 9. Americans for Fair Electronic Commerce Transactions (AFFECT), at http://www. 
4cite.org (last visited Jan. 27, 2002). 
 10. See Iowa Code Ann. § 554D.104(4)(2001); N.C.G.S.A. § 66-329 (2001); W.Va. Code 
Sec. 55-8-15 (2001). 
 11. See American Bar Association Working Group Report on the Uniform Computer 
Information Transaction Act, January 31, 2002, at http://www.abanet.org [hereinafter, A.B.A. 
UCITA Report] (finding, among other problems, that UCITA is “extremely difficult to 
understand” and that its scope is uncertain). 
 12. Id. at 24 (MINORITY REPORT by Donald A. Cohn (stating that the fact that the A.B.A. 
has not endorsed UCITA, as it normally does with uniform laws, will hurt its prospects for 
enactment). Cohn also issued an addendum to his minority report that said, “I have been unable 
to find any really positive statements with regard to anything that the NCCUSL and A.B.A. 
advisors have been laboring over for ten (10) years . . . .” Id. at 37. 
 13. See supra note 5. 
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is a better approach. The courts frequently apply Article 2 to software 
transactions, often without stating whether they are applying it 
directly or using it as persuasive authority. A comment to the 
Restatement (Third) of Torts has recognized the general applicability 
of Article 2, stating: “Under the [U.C.C.] software that is mass-
marketed is considered a good . . . . However, software that was 
developed specifically for the customer is a service.”14 The 
application of Article 2 is unproblematic for most issues, including 
contract formation, warranties and damages. On the other hand, 
transfer and use restrictions are not dealt with in Article 2, because 
they are inconsistent with the idea of a cash sale. (In a credit sale or a 
lease, in contrast, the secured party or lessor is concerned about 
protecting its rights in the goods and thus has a legitimate interest in 
restricting transfer and use; the secured party has a contingent 
property interest and the lessor remains the owner and has a 
reversionary interest.) When it comes to transfer and use restrictions 
in software transactions labeled “licenses,” courts have to decide 
whether the transaction is really a disguised sale, designed to evade 
the user protections of federal intellectual property law, including the 
first sale and fair use doctrines.15 
As long as UCITA has some life in the legislatures or the 
leadership of NCCUSL, it may be impossible to draft uniform law 
appropriately governing transfer and use restrictions. UCITA 
purports to deal with these issues, along with all others, by “freedom 
of contract.”16 UCITA does not actually use a free contract system, 
but rather a regulatory system that delegates to licensors the power to 
impose terms by delayed boilerplate.17 The A.B.A. task force on 
UCITA squarely rejected this approach as without “any economic 
justification” and called for terms to be disclosed before the customer 
pays or becomes bound to the transaction.18 Even if UCITA did leave 
 
 14. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 19 cmt.(d) (1997). 
 15. For a discussion of the cases, see Softman Prods. Co. v. Adobe Syss., Inc., 2001 WL 
1343955 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (reviewing the case law and finding that a transaction denominated a 
“License” was in fact a sale, so that the first sale doctrine permitted transfer). 
 16. See UCITA, prefatory note (2000). 
 17. UCITA §§ 208, 209, 112. U.C.C. § 2-207(2) and its comments reject this approach. 
U.C.C. § 2-207(2) cmts. 2-7 (2001). 
 18. See A.B.A. UCITA Report, supra note 11. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol8/iss1/9
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transfer and use issues to the contracting parties, a contract is an 
inadequate vehicle for development of competition and information 
policy. Antitrust and intellectual property law recognize this point.19 
When the smoke finally clears from the UCITA wars, it may be 
possible to deal sensibly with transfer and use issues as part of a new 
effort at a “hub and spoke” revision of Article 2. This would permit 
use of a hub of provisions applicable to all types of goods, including 
smart goods and software products, along with spokes applicable 
only to certain types of transactions, such as those in copies of 
software. A “hub and spoke” approach was briefly considered in 
1995 during the Article 2 revision process,20 but it was abandoned 
before a serious effort to implement it, when the leadership of 
NCCUSL decided instead to create a separate project to draft U.C.C. 
Article 2B.21 The advantage of the “hub and spoke” approach is that 
it reduces the need to apply multiple bodies of law to mixed 
transactions in hard and soft products, but still permits some different 
legal rules for particular types of goods. Formation, warranty and 
damages provisions should be the same for all goods, but transfer and 
use provisions might be different for software. On the other hand, 
transactions with transfer and use restrictions may eventually be 
legitimately employed for goods other than software, and if so, the 
revised Article 2 spokes concerning transfer and use restrictions 
could be made more generally applicable. 
A uniform law is not the only possible approach. Contractual 
transfer and use restrictions could be left to the common law, perhaps 
supported by a “Restatement of Licensing.” Alternatively, a federal 
statutory approach to contract transfer and use restrictions might be 
best because the issues are so intertwined with federal intellectual 
property and competition law.  
 
 19. See generally Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (2000); MARK A. LEMLEY ET 
AL., SOFTWARE AND INTERNET LAW 539-44 (2000) (overview of antitrust law restrictions on 
monopolization and agreements in restraint of trade and discussion of modern view that 
intellectual property laws are also designed to promote competition). 
 20. Linda J. Rusch, A History and Perspective of Revised Article 2: The Never Ending 
Saga of a Search for Balance, 52 SMU L. REV. 1683 (1999). 
 21. Proposed Article 2B was renamed UCITA after A.L.I. withdrew from the project and 
NCCUSL decided to promulgate it as a freestanding uniform law. See supra note 7 and 
accompanying text. 
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CLASSIFYING SOFTWARE AS GOODS: A FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 
Contemporary commercial law takes a functional approach to 
classification issues. For example, a “security interest” is 
distinguished from a “lease” on the basis of the economic realities of 
the transaction.22 An economically meaningful reversionary interest 
in the lessor is the essence of a lease.23 Simply calling a transaction a 
“lease” will not avail a seller who reasonably expects to get the goods 
back only upon default; such a transaction is really a credit sale, not a 
true lease. Similarly, in deciding whether to apply Article 2 to hybrid 
transactions or to non-sale transactions, the courts look to policy 
considerations and ask whether the particular Article 2 section in 
question functions well as the governing law for the issue in 
question.24 
Interestingly, before he became reporter for UCITA, Professor 
Raymond Nimmer took the functional approach to classification of 
software transactions: 
Ownership of a copy should be determined based on the actual 
character, rather than the label, of the transaction by which the 
user obtained possession. Merely labeling a transaction as a 
lease or license does not control. If a transaction involves a 
single payment giving the buyer an unlimited period in which 
it has a right to possession, the transaction is a sale. In this 
situation, the buyer owns the copy regardless of the label the 
parties use for the contract. Course of dealing and trade usage 
may be relevant, since they establish the expectations and 
intent of the parties. The pertinent issue is whether, as in a 
 
 22. U.C.C. § 1-201(37) (2000) (defining “security interest”); U.C.C. § 1-201(37) cmt. 37 
(noting “all of these tests [in the statutory text] focus on economics, not the intent of the 
parties”). 
 23. See, e.g., In re Bumgardner, 183 B.R. 224, 228 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1995); In re Allen, 
174 B.R. 293, 295 (Bankr. Or. 1994); Carlson v. Giacchetti, 616 N.E.2d 810, 814 (Mass. App. 
Ct. 1993); Woodson v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 114 B.R. 278, 284-85 (U.S.D.C. N.D. Okal. 
1990); In re Aspen Impressions, Inc., 94 B.R. 861 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1989). 
 24. JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT SUMMERS, 1 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 3 (4th ed. 
1995). “We believe that the best general approach for courts to take is to determine what policy 
objectives the particular Code section in question implicates, and then, in light of those policies, 
determine whether the particular facts of the transaction invite the application of the section by 
analogy.” Id. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol8/iss1/9
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lease, the user may be required to return the copy to the vendor 
after the expiration of a particular period. If not, the transaction 
conveyed not only possession, but also transferred ownership 
of the copy.25 
In a recent case concerning applicability of the first sale doctrine to a 
computer program, the court quoted this passage from Nimmer and 
then concluded that a transaction involving a single payment for a 
perpetual transfer of possession is a sale that transfers ownership of 
the copy of software.26 
There are two basic classification issues in the treatment of 
software contracts. The first is whether software is goods. The second 
is to what extent these transactions, often designated “licenses,” are 
like sales and to what extent they are legitimately viewed as different. 
The first issue is easier to evaluate. The second is addressed below 
with a focus on the End User License Agreement (EULA). 
Even in the twenty-first century, lawyers find it hard to give up 
certain vestiges of formalism. Thus, in making the determination 
whether software is goods, some commercial lawyers want to debate 
whether copies of software are “tangible.” This approach can be tied 
to the Article 2 definitional requirement of a movable thing.27 Even if 
software is not a “thing,” the courts may apply Article 2 by analogy.28 
Often the courts apply Article 2 without stating whether they are 
doing so directly or by analogy. 
The software industry uses an instrumental approach to the 
tangibility issue. For purposes of the Copyright Act, software 
producers argue that copies of software in random access memory 
(RAM) are “material objects” deserving copyright protection.29 When 
 
 25. RAYMOND NIMMER, THE LAW OF COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY, § 1.18(1) (1992). 
 26. Softman Prods. Co. v. Adobe Syss., Inc., 2001 WL 1343955 (C.D. Cal. 2001). 
 27. U.C.C. § 2-105(1) (2001). 
 28. U.C.C. § 1-102 cmt. 1. 
 29. Federal copyright law treats copies of software as tangible when it defines copies to 
include “material objects . . . from which the work can be perceived . . . with the aid of a 
machine.” 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994). If copies of software were not material objects, then 
copyright law would not bar one from making unauthorized copies. See MAI Syss. Corp. v. 
Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 517-19 (9th Cir. 1993) (placing a computer program in 
RAM qualifies as copying for copyright purposes). See also Joseph P. Liu, Owning Digital 
Copies, Copyright Law and the Incidents of Copy Ownership, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1245 
(2001) (arguing that copyright law should preserve users’ rights by recognizing an unlimited 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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it comes to issues concerning the scope of UCITA and Article 2, 
however, software companies argue that copies of computer 
programs are not movable things and should not be within Article 2. 
Using a functional approach, it makes sense to treat software as 
goods for most Article 2 issues because the policies of Article 2 are 
fitting. Moreover, courts apply this rationale. The technical 
requirement under Article 2 for a “thing” can be met by using the 
analysis contained in the copyright definition of “copies,”30 which 
notes that a copy of software must be tangible to be read by a 
computer.31  
The case of a freestanding software product delivered in an 
 
right to access digital copies in one’s possession and a more limited right to transfer digital 
copies to others). 
 30. Another body of law implicated in this tangibility debate is the Magnuson-Moss 
Warranty Act, which applies to warranties of consumer products, defined in terms of “tangible 
personal property.” 15 U.S.C. § 2301(1) (1994). Copies of digital code have to be tangible to be 
machine readable. See supra text accompanying note 29. The Federal Trade Commission 
should promulgate a regulation to clarify that copies of software are tangible products. See 16 
C.F.R. § 700.1(a) (1999) (stating “[w]here it is unclear whether a particular product is covered 
under the definition of consumer product, any ambiguity will be resolved in favor of 
coverage”). Another issue is whether there is a sale for purposes of Magnuson-Moss. Its 
definition of “written warranty” refers to warranties in connection with a “sale.” 15 U.S.C. 
§ 2301(6). Sale is not a defined term but its meaning is a matter of federal law. It is of 
persuasive importance, however, that in the absence of UCITA, courts generally apply Article 
2, of the U.C.C. to software transactions. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS-PRODUCTS 
LIABILITY, supra note 14 (under the U.C.C., “software that is mass-marketed is considered a 
good”). There is nothing in the federal statute that suggests that Congress wished to delegate to 
the states the power to remove transactions from the scope of Magnuson-Moss by creating a 
new transaction name for a transaction functionally the same as, or closely analogous to, a sale. 
The definition of “implied warranty” in Magnuson-Moss, 15 U.S.C. § 2301(7), incorporates 
state law implied warranties in connection with sales. However, because UCITA also 
recognizes such warranties, the UCITA implied warranties would come within the Magnuson-
Moss definition if federal law interprets the meaning of “sale” in Magnuson-Moss to include 
consumer software transactions. 
 31. See text accompanying supra note 29. Recently, high tech companies have begun to 
use another feature of the law of goods, the common law tort of trespass to chattels, to protect 
computer systems and online databases. Trespass to chattels is a tort that protects chattels 
against dispossession or intermeddling by means of physical contact. See RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS, § 217 (1995). In CompuServe, Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc., 962 F. 
Supp. 1015, 1021 (S.D. Ohio 1997), a case holding that sending of unwanted e-mails is 
actionable as a trespass to chattels, the court noted that electronic signals are sufficiently 
tangible to support a claim for trespass. For other cases dealing with trespass to chattels by 
means of electronic access to computer systems, see Ebay v. Bidders Edge, 100 F. Supp.2d 
1058 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (involving use of search robots to obtain website content); Intel v. 
Hamidi, 114 Cal. Rprt.2d 244 (Cal. App. 4th 2000) (involving sending inflammatory e-mails). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol8/iss1/9
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electronic file, considered the most difficult by some, can be made 
easy: This software is tangible because it can drive a machine.32 One 
advantage of starting with the supposedly difficult case is that all 
other cases then fall into line. For example, if software in an 
electronic file is tangible and considered goods, it follows that 
software embedded in goods is tangible and thus is also goods. A 
functional approach also stresses that U.C.C. Article 2 works well for 
most issues in software disputes because, like other goods, copies of 
software are functional products. The value of many other products 
also lies in intangible inputs such as design, whether patented or not, 
and workmanship, rather than in raw materials. For example, the raw 
materials in a car represent a tiny fraction of its value. Yet, at the end 
of the production process, cars are sold to “end users.” The end users 
do not buy the car’s design elements or the services that went into 
making the car. The same can be said of software end-use customers; 
both the car and software purchaser acquire a functional product. 
Although Article 2 works well as a basic framework, it has not 
been sufficient for consumer transactions. A great deal of state and 
federal statutory consumer law supplements this framework.33 By 
treating software as something other than goods, UCITA 
unnecessarily raises issues about whether the law applicable to 
consumer goods applies to software.34 Furthermore, by not creating 
analogous consumer law for software transactions, UCITA leaves 
this problem unresolved. Rejecting UCITA and treating software as 
goods eliminates the need to reinvent consumer law to cover 
 
 32. Some would say that only a copy in “object” code is tangible, but the distinction 
between “source” code and “object” code is itself not clear, because source code can be 
converted to object code by a computer program. David S. Touretzky, Source vs. Object Code: 
A False Dichotomy, July 12, 2000, available at http://www/cs/ci,/edi/~dst/DeCss/object-
code.txt. 
 33. See, e.g., Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2301 (1994). See supra note 30 
(discussing the scope of Magnuson-Moss). 
 34. See supra text accompanying note 30. UCITA § 105(c) deals with conflicts between 
consumer protection laws and UCITA, but it does not provide that existing consumer protection 
statutes applicable to goods also apply to UCITA transactions. See UCITA § 105(c) (2000). A 
change in section 105(c) proposed by NCCUSL’s UCITA Standby Committee would provide 
that the act does not supersede a consumer protection law “applicable to the subject matter of 
this Act.” Report of the UCITA Standby Committee, Dec. 17, 2001 (on file with author). Under 
either version, therefore, it is left to attorneys general and consumer advocates to press for 
revisions of state consumer protection laws to make them applicable to UCITA transactions. 
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software. 
Treating even freestanding software in electronic form as goods 
avoids line-drawing based on means of storage and delivery (whether 
on a disk or in an electronic file and whether in Read Only Memory 
or Random Access Memory). The drafters of Revised Article 2 
attempted to include embedded software within its scope by explicit, 
technical language, but they were stymied by the fact that it becomes 
ever harder to distinguish embedded and non-embedded software.35 If 
much depends on any given test, the product could be re-engineered 
to take advantage of whatever legal regime is preferable. Thus, 
attempting a distinction would likely drive engineering decisions in 
undesirable ways.36 
UCITA concedes the analogous character of software to other 
goods by making use of Article 2’s general approach to many of the 
issues. UCITA then proceeds to tweak Article 2’s rules in favor of 
software producers in ways that other sellers would like to have 
applied to themselves. For example, UCITA gives explicit approval 
to holding back terms until after payment and delivery of a product, 
an approach that certain sellers, such as the computer company 
Gateway, Inc., would like to use with impunity.37 There are two less 
 
 35. Philp Koopman & Cem Kaner, The Problem of Embedded Software in UCITA and 
Drafts of Revised Article 2, 43 U.C.C. BULL., rel. 1 & 2 (2001).  
 36. Id. 
 37. Compare UCITA §§ 208, 209, 112; with Klocek v. Gateway, 104 F. Supp.2d 1332 (D. 
Kan. 2000). Klocek has the most complete analysis of why Article 2 does not make material 
terms in the box enforceable. Id. at 1339-42. See also Jean Braucher, Delayed Disclosure in 
Consumer E-Commerce as an Unfair and Deceptive Practice, 46 WAYNE L. REV. 1805, 1819-
1824 (2000) (discussing Klocek and other cases concerning delayed terms and arguing that 
Article 2 does not validate material terms sent after contract formation, which ordinarily occurs 
at the latest upon order and delivery). The leading cases treating delayed material terms as valid 
have come from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 7th Circuit, and the first case in this line, 
ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1450 (7th Cir. 1996), applied Article 2 to software 
and data on a CD, stating: “we treat the licenses as ordinary contracts accompanying the sale of 
products, and therefore as governed by the common law of contracts and the Uniform 
Commercial Code.” The ProCD court, while applying Article 2 to software, seems to have been 
led astray in its reading of Article 2 by then-proposed U.C.C. Article 2B, which it cited and 
explained as follows, “New words may be designed to fortify the current rule with a more 
precise text that curtails uncertainty.” Id. Since the ProCD case, the A.L.I. has withdrawn from 
the Article 2B project, a high-level A.B.A. task force has strongly criticized the approach to 
contracting taken in UCITA, and most states have declined to enact UCITA. See supra text 
accompanying notes 7-11. As a result, courts should not continue to use UCITA as persuasive 
authority concerning the meaning of Article 2. 
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frequently discussed examples of significant differences between 
UCITA and Article 2. First, UCITA has a lower standard of 
performance that cuts off certain customers’ right to exit the 
transaction.38 A buyer of goods may reject the goods for any 
nonconformity to the contract, whereas a non-mass market licensee 
under UCITA may reject goods only for a material breach. Second, 
UCITA rejects the Article 2 case law dealing with the question what 
remedies are available to consumers when the contract limits the 
remedy to repair but repair cannot be accomplished. When a limited 
remedy of repair fails its essential purpose, a consumer buyer has a 
right to consequential and incidental damages, even if the parties 
excluded those damages in the original contract.39 UCITA provides 
that if the licensor includes a term making the exclusion of 
consequential and incidental damages independent of the agreed 
remedy, then the failure of the essential purpose of that agreed 
remedy does not allow recovery of consequential and incidental 
damages.40 
The differences between UCITA and Revised Article 2 should be 
understood as having more to do with the differences in the views of 
the members of the two drafting committees than with differences in 
the character of the goods covered by each statute. The fact that 
UCITA tips the balance in favor of the producer means that 
conventional goods sellers are likely to find UCITA’s invitation to 
“opt in” on the basis of software elements of the goods attractive.41 
Some functional arguments that the law of goods does not work 
well for software are that it is easily copied and inherently buggy. 
While it is true that digital material can be easily copied, federal 
 
 38. Compare UCITA § 704 (2000) (refusal of tender permitted for “material breach” in 
non-mass-market transactions), with U.C.C. § 2-601 (2000) (so called “perfect tender” rule, 
permitting rejection of goods for any conformity to the contract). 
 39. See U.C.C. § 2-719(2). Revised Article 2, in the 1999 NCCUSL annual meeting draft, 
would have retained this rule for consumers. 
 40. See UCITA § 803(c). 
 41. See UCITA § 104, which allows opt-in to UCITA in the case of a “material” software 
element. Comment 4(b)(3) to section 103 states that, “Materiality is ordinarily clear if the 
program is separately licensed as part of the transaction.” UCITA § 104 cmt. 4(b)(3). Thus, by 
putting a “license” clause in the standard form contract, software in goods is brought within 
UCITA and provides the basis for opting the entire transaction into UCITA. This would include 
its contract formation rules. See UCITA § 104.  
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intellectual property law already deals forcefully with unauthorized 
copying. Willful infringement is a crime, subject to criminal fines and 
up to five years in prison for the first offense.42 A commercial 
contracting statute is not likely to add much deterrence for parties 
willing to risk criminal sanctions. In addition, although software is 
often buggy, this state of affairs may be more a result of producers’ 
choices to rush products to market than anything inherent about 
software. Domestic law facilitating shoddy engineering may lead to 
long-term competitive disadvantages in the world market.43  
Treating software as goods is the easy classification issue in 
software licensing. The more difficult issue concerns to what extent 
these transactions should be treated as sales as opposed to “licenses.” 
The issues concerning the licensing form of transaction, particularly 
the EULA, are discussed in the next section. 
A FOCUS ON TRANSACTION TYPE–WHY THE END USER LICENSE 
AGREEMENT? 
It is useful to distinguish the two kinds of software license lumped 
together in UCITA. One is the license of intellectual property rights 
as part of a distribution system that uses intermediaries. This is 
conventional intellectual property licensing, also used in publication 
of books, music, and films, where the owner of the copyright licenses 
some of its rights to a distributor to permit that party to make and to 
distribute copies to ultimate customers. 
The other type of software license is known as the End User 
License Agreement (EULA). This type of licensing is a more recent 
legal innovation. It raises novel competition and information policy 
issues. The EULA may be used in either direct or indirect marketing. 
In indirect marketing, the copyright owner typically requires the 
intermediary to distribute the copy of the product with the EULA. 
Under UCITA, the EULA is conceived of as creating privity of 
contract, although this privity might not be the conclusion under 
common law. In direct marketing, the EULA is clearly the contract 
 
 42. See 17 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1998); 18 U.S.C. § 2319 (2001). 
 43. Cem Kaner, Software Engineering and UCITA, 18 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & 
INFO. L. 435, 527-46 (2000). 
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between the producer and the customer under both UCITA and the 
common law, if validly assented to.  
Software producers have various reasons for using the EULA 
rather than selling or authorizing sales of copies.44 Perpetual licenses 
of software copies, a common form of EULA, are functionally like 
sales of copies, except for efforts to restrict transfer and use. A 
primary reason for employing end user licenses in mass marketing is 
to change intellectual property rights otherwise provided to users by 
federal law. Professor Charles McManis has detailed the copyrights 
of users that EULAs potentially threaten, particularly fair use rights 
of criticism, comment, and research.45  
My focus is on another purpose of the EULA, a purpose that is at 
least in part legitimate. Under the first sale doctrine, the owner of a 
copy of a copyrighted work has the right to transfer the copy without 
the permission of the copyright owner.46 Assuming federal law 
permits, the EULA is a way to prohibit transfer and restrict use in 
order to implement price discrimination, also known as price 
differentiation.47 
Price discrimination involves charging customers based on their 
willingness to pay. It is legal when not accompanied by efforts to 
undermine competitors.48 By pricing according to number of users or 
 
 44. The history of the EULA dates to a time when intellectual property protection for 
computer programs was first doubtful and then of uncertain scope. See Softman Prods. Co. v. 
Adobe Syss., Inc., 2001 WL 1343955 (C.D. Cal. 2001); see also Step-Saver Data Syss., Inc. v. 
Wise Tech., 939 F. 2d 96 n.7 (3d Cir. 1991) (describing the EULA as “largely anachronistic” 
after Congress amended the first sale doctrine in 1990 to prohibit commercial lending or leasing 
of software, to deal with the risk of unauthorized copying); Lothar Determann & Aaron Xavier 
Fellmeth, Don’t Judge a Sale by Its License: Software Transfers Under the First Sale Doctrine 
in the United State and the European Community, 36 U.S.F. L. REV. 1 (2001) (arguing that use 
of license terminology should have no impact on whether a transaction is a sale for purposes of 
the first sale doctrine and suggesting that a software transaction can be both a sale and a 
license). Other transactions fit under more than one category; for example a secured credit sale 
is both a secured transaction and a sale. 
 45. See Charles McManis, The Privatization (or “Shrink-Wrapping”) of American 
Copyright Law, 87 CAL. L. REV. 173 (1999). 
 46. 17 U.S.C. § 109 (1998). 
 47. See Michael J. Meurer, Price Discrimination, Personal Use and Piracy: Copyright 
Protection of Digital Works, 45 BUFF. L. REV. 845 (1997); CARL SHAPIRO & HAL R. VARIAN, 
INFORMATION RULES: A STRATEGIC GUIDE TO THE NETWORK ECONOMY 19-51, 299-300 
(1999) (using the term “price differentiation” to distinguish legal price discrimination from that 
which violates the Robinson-Patman Act of 1936). 
 48. Id. 
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type of use, licensors can charge large companies more than small 
ones or individuals. The number of users operates as a rough measure 
of the product’s value to the customer. Site licensing is a way to fine-
tune this value-based pricing. Setting different prices for home use or 
commercial purposes is another way to discriminate on the basis of 
the value customers place on the product.  
Economists note that price discrimination benefits licensors by 
allowing them to capture more of the consumer surplus. Price 
discrimination, however, is not completely bad for users. For 
example, price discrimination benefits small users who would not be 
willing to pay the single price that would otherwise be charged to 
recapture investment. Price discrimination reduces the deadweight 
loss of foregone consumer surplus that occurs in a one price regime.49  
Some transfer and use restrictions are necessary to maintain price 
discrimination and prevent arbitrage by favored customers. Without 
enforceable transfer restrictions, a customer who acquired for 
personal use at a low price might resell to a company with many 
users and a commercial use purpose. If restrictions on the number of 
users or type of use were not permissible, it would be impossible to 
use these methods of approximating the value that customers put on 
the product. Software companies seek to make customers “licensees” 
rather than “buyers” of copies to have enforceable restrictions on 
transfer and use, making possible the benefits of price discrimination. 
While producers need limited enhancement of their property 
rights to enforce price discrimination, these rights could have 
undesirable side effects if not carefully constrained. These potential 
side effects of licensing include reduced access to expression and 
information now obtained on the second-hand market, in the public 
domain, and by shared use through libraries and educational 
institutions.50 The switch from books and journals to e-books and 
electronic databases should not be an occasion to reduce public 
access to information or to negatively effect second generation 
creation. In short, licensing that facilitates contractual price 
discrimination has the potential to negatively transform access to 
 
 49. See Julie E. Cohen, Copyright and the Perfect Curve, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1799 (2000). 
 50. See id.; Wendy J. Gordon, Intellectual Property As Price Discrimination: Implications 
for Copyright, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1367 (1998). 
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expression and information. It also could have harmful effects on 
competition in goods markets. 
UCITA makes transfer and use restrictions in EULAs 
presumptively enforceable.51 Section 105 then provides a case-by-
case tool to undo any damage to fundamental public policy done by 
such restrictions.52 It is possible to do better than this vague policing 
mechanism. There are issues that will arise routinely and that need 
explicit solutions. 
Certain transfers need to be protected against attempted 
contractual restriction. Transfer restrictions have the potential to 
eliminate the used product market with several negative effects on 
consumer welfare. Used product markets create downward pressure 
on prices of new products. They also provide access to products and 
expression for those unable or unwilling to pay the lowest price 
available for the new item. Another problem with transfer restrictions 
is their potential to burden mergers and acquisitions of businesses, 
creating windfall gains for producers who would be able to extract a 
new fee for transfer of the license to a new owner, even if the type of 
use remained the same.53 
Currently, the “license” form of transaction is not commonly used 
for goods other than software. Price discrimination in hard goods is 
achieved through product differentiation. Licensing of software 
elements in goods could, however, lead to the use of transfer 
restrictions on software elements in goods, thereby adversely 
affecting second-hand markets in consumer goods such as cars, 
appliances and electronic components. Furthermore, the license form 
might be adopted for the whole transaction. Soon, licensing may not 
be limited to software in goods, but may be used for the entire 
product. We might even see goods with no software in them, such as 
 
 51. UCITA §§ 307(b), 503(2) (2000). 
 52. See UCTIA § 105(b) (giving courts discretionary power to refuse to enforce contract 
terms that violate fundamental public policy). 
 53. Virginia’s version of UCITA was originally enacted with a non-uniform protection for 
transfers as part of a merger or acquisition. VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-505.3(2)(D) (2000). As a 
result of a lobbying effort by producers, both houses of the Virginia legislature have voted to 
strike the provision, and at this writing, the bill awaits the governor’s signature. Patrick 
Thibodeau, Virginia to nix key UCITA provision; Merging firms could be kept from transferring 
their software license, COMPUTER WORLD, Mar. 18, 2002, available at 
http://www.computerworld.com/ storyba/0,4125,NAV47_STO69198,00.html. 
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clothing, being licensed, putting used clothing stores and Goodwill 
Industries out of business because of transfer restrictions. It is 
possible that price discrimination without product differentiation will 
become a feature of all goods markets, allowing producers to charge 
more to those who put a higher value on the goods.  
Leasing of goods is already common. A comparison of licenses 
and leases is illuminating. As noted above, the essence of a lease 
transaction is an economically meaningful reversion in the lessor.54 
Because a lessor of goods expects to get the goods back, use 
restrictions are a legitimate feature of a lease and provide a means to 
preserve the value of the reversionary interest. Licensors of software 
do not have an economic interest in copies distributed to end users 
because they can make another copy at little or no cost; the copies 
have no reversionary value. The purposes of transfer and use 
restrictions in licenses are to police price discrimination and also 
potentially to inhibit competition. If transfer of goods is prohibited, 
then competition from the second-hand market is eliminated. If 
comment and criticism are prohibited, this ban inhibits competition 
over quality.55 
A car license for a term shorter than the useful life of the car is 
effectively a lease because of the reversion value. Conversely, a 
perpetual car license is not a lease because there is no reversion 
value. The only difference between a license and sale would be that 
the license entails restrictions on use and transfer, necessary to 
achieve price discrimination without product differentiation. It is 
 
 54. See U.C.C. § 1-201(37) (2001); U.C.C. § 1-201(37) cmt. 37. See In re Bumgardner, 
183 B.R. 224, 228 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1995); In re Allen, 174 B.R. 293, 295 (Bankr. Or. 1994); 
Carlson v. Giacchetti, 616 N.E.2d 810, 814 (Mass. App. Ct. 1993); Woodson v. Ford Motor 
Co., 114 B.R. 278, 284-85 (U.S.D.C. N.D. Okal. 1990); In re Aspen Impressions, Inc., 94 B.R. 
861 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1989). 
 55. For further analysis of issues concerning use of the EULA in software transactions, 
see David A. Rice, License with Contract and Precedent: Publisher-Licensor Protection 
Consequences and the Rationale Offered for the Nontransferabilty of Licenses under Article 
2B, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1239 (1998) (arguing that the policy implications of permitting 
boilerplate transfer restrictions have not been adequately aired or addressed); see also David A. 
Rice, Digital Information as Property and Product: U.C.C. Article 2B, 22 U. DAYTON L. REV. 
621 (1997); David A. Rice, Public Goods, Private Contract and Public Policy: Federal 
Preemption of Software License Prohibitions Against Reverse Engineering, 53 U. PITT. L. REV. 
543 (1992); David A. Rice, Licensing the Use of Computer Program Copies and the Copyright 
Act First Sale Doctrine, 30 JURIMETRICS J. 157 (1990). 
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noteworthy that in secured credit sales, use and transfer restrictions 
are permitted to preserve collateral value. In a perpetual license of a 
car or other hard goods for cash, however, the only purposes for use 
and transfer restrictions would be to enforce price discrimination and 
to potentially inhibit competition. 
Car licensing may never come to pass, but Palm Pilots, in which 
the software is the predominant component, are already licensed. It is 
conceivable that other goods with or without software will be 
licensed. It is possible that licensing will be a boon to producers and 
also to the customers who could get the benefit of lower prices due to 
price discrimination. This potential benefit is another reason why the 
law of hardware and software should be integrated. Rules developed 
for transfer and use restrictions in software licensing are likely to 
work for hard goods, too. 
The major problems with transfer and use restrictions in license 
transactions are impact on fair use and competition. Another problem 
of some significance is that transfer restrictions have the potential to 
exacerbate solid waste disposal problems. There is already a problem 
of what to do with the vast number of computers discarded each year. 
Enforceable transfer restrictions on computer operating systems, 
which would eliminate reuse by second-hand buyers or donees not 
willing to pay new “license” fees, would turn even more old 
computers into unwanted junk. Waste problems would be 
compounded dramatically by enforceable transfer restrictions on 
embedded software in cars and appliances or by transfer restrictions 
in licenses of hard goods themselves. 
It is likely that the solid waste problem can be dealt with by the 
same legal rules that are needed to remedy the negative impacts on 
competition from transfer and use restrictions. At a minimum, the law 
should make unenforceable transfer restrictions that operate against 
the same category of user, whether the transfer is direct or through an 
intermediary. For example, a consumer licensee should be able to 
make a transfer to another consumer licensee or to a second-hand 
dealer who sells to consumers. Protecting transfers to the same 
category of user would preserve the second-hand market for e-books, 
software, and Palm Pilots, while still permitting price discrimination 
(because a consumer could not make a transfer to a commercial user, 
if the license so provided). Similarly, allowing businesses to transfer 
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their mass-market software when the business is sold would avoid 
counterproductive restraints on alienation and windfalls of new fees 
for producers. Expanded use by a larger acquiring company should, 
however, be subject to enforceable restrictions to maintain price 
discrimination. Transfer restrictions are also needed to protect trade 
secrets in non-mass market software products. 
Other limits on transfer and use restrictions may be important to 
protect gifts, even though the gift is from one category of user to 
another. For example, a donation by an individual of a used computer 
with its operating system to an impoverished school or church does 
not cost the producer of the operating system anything if the school 
or church would not have otherwise acquired an operating system. 
Nevertheless, it is not an easy matter to draft a rule to capture the 
nuances of this problem. It may be that charitable donations generally 
should be protected in order to protect the instances where they do 
not cost the producer and provide social benefits.56 
A premise of my limited defense of the EULA is that transfer and 
use restrictions should have to be effectively communicated before 
deals are consummated. A Microsoft lawyer famously wrote that “the 
license is the product.”57 Customers need to know in advance what 
the product is, and this is among the reasons that UCITA’s 
“contracting” model is indefensible.58  
CONCLUSION 
Classification of software contracts involves two questions, 
whether software is goods and whether the transaction type should be 
seen as involving a sale, a license, or perhaps both at once. The first 
question, involving classification of the subject matter of the 
transaction, is relatively easy; a functional analysis leads to treating 
 
 56. See VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-505.3(2)(C) (2000) (prohibiting restrictions on transfer of 
mass market licenses to public elementary and secondary schools, public libraries, charitabale 
organizations, and from consumer to consumer). 
 57. Robert Gomulkiewicz, The License is the Product: Comments on the Promise of 
Article 2B for Software and Information Licensing, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 891 (1998). 
 58. See Braucher, supra note 37. In consumer contracts, use of UCITA’s delayed 
disclosure model for material terms, including transfer and use restrictions, subjects software 
companies to enforcement actions under the Federal Trade Commission Act and the states’ 
equivalents. Id.; see also A.B.A. UCITA Report, supra note 11. 
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copies of software, sold as products, as goods. The second question, 
concerning classification of the transaction type, is more complex. A 
legitimate function of the End User License Agreement (EULA) is to 
enable price discrimination, to the benefit of producers and customers 
who would otherwise forego transactions (because a higher price 
would be charged under a single price regime). While some transfer 
and use restrictions are necessary to enforce price discrimination, 
producers have tended to write EULAs that go beyond this purpose 
and that have the potential to burden competition by eliminating 
second-hand markets and burdening mergers and acquisitions. EULA 
restrictions on fair use rights also interfere with the information 
policy reflected in intellectual property law. Nuanced law reform, 
certainly more nuanced than is found in UCITA, will be needed to 
distinguish legitimate from illegitimate uses of the EULA. If 
licensing of smart goods or perhaps even “dumb” goods comes to 
pass, nuanced treatment of transfer and use restrictions will be 
needed in the law of goods generally, not just for software 
transactions. 
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